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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The jury in this case held that plaintiff had proved defendant was negligent but that
defendant's negligence did not proximately cause plaintiffs injury. The trial court, prior
to trial, had ruled that the construction contract entered into between the defendant and
federal government would not be admitted into evidence and barred plaintiffs
construction expert from testifying.
Both rulings were in error and the excluded evidence went directly to the issue of
proximate causation. Had the excluded evidence been received by the jury it would have
had a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict. Plaintiff is, therefore,
entitled to a new trial.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

In reviewing the trial court's legal conclusion to exclude the construction

contract from evidence the review is for correctness, granting no deference. Aultv.
HoIden,P.3d781.
2.

The review of the trial court's decision to exclude plaintiffs expert

testimony is for an abuse of discretion. Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2d 445
(Utah App. 1989)
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
None.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Following the trial court's evidentiary rulings the case was tried to a jury. The jury
held that plaintiff had proved defendant U-Systems was negligent as alleged (Jury
Instruction No. 26, R. 567) but that defendant U-Systems' negligence was not a
proximate cause of plaintiff s injury.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Yvonne Day was a construction inspector employed at Hill Air Force Base
(HAFB). She worked for the federal government (Transcript, 67). It was her job to see
that civilian contractors at HAFB performed their work in compliance with the
requirements of the Uniform Building Code. (TR. 68) Therefore, she was required to go
to the various construction sites on HAFB to perform her inspections.
Defendant U-Systems, Inc. had bid on and received a government contract to
renovate approximately 78 housing units located on HAFB. (TR. 70) The contract
contained specific safety requirements: 1) that Federal OSF1A standard had to be
complied with; 2) that US Army Corps of Engineer safety standards had to be met (R.
222-227); 3) that U-Systems was required to keep the construction site safe for anyone,
including federal government employees, who came onto the site (TR. 81-82); and 4)
that defendant U-Systems had to have a full-time safety person on site. (TR. 79)
On November 18, 1997, a representative of defendant U-Systems called Allen
Collins, the federal government project manager, and asked for an insulation inspection in
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one of the housing units. (TR. 83) Yvonne Day was sent to the site to conduct the
inspection. She was accompanied by Lareen Parkinson, a new trainee in the construction
inspection office.
At the site, in a duplex, Ms. Day and Ms. Parkinson encountered sheetrock leaned
vertically against a stud wall. The individual sheets were approximately 15 ft. in length.
There were eight sheets. Each sheet weighed in excess of 100 lbs. Defendant's
construction superintendent acknowledged at trial that sheetrock stored on edge is a
hazard (TR. 199) because it can fall and the degree of hazard is dependent entirely on
how vertically the sheetrock is stacked (TR. 201) if not laid flat or tied off.
Behind the sheetrock was the insulation Ms. Day had been sent to inspect. It was
her job to confirm proper installation. It appeared to have been installed incorrectly and
in fact was not in compliance with building code requirements. (TR. 85) As Ms. Day
attempted to peer over the top of the sheetrock to assess the situation (Ms. Day is only 5
ft. tall), Lareen Parkinson, the new employee, pulled on one end of the stack believing
that would help Ms. Day see the insulation. As she did so, the sheetrock (weighing
collectively between 800 - 900 lbs.) was immediately overbalanced and all fell away from
the wall (TR. 133) knocking Ms. Day to the floor causing Ms. Day to sustain, among
other injuries, a skull fracture.
Federal OSHA regulation 1926.250(a)(1) (R. 227) directs that "all materials stored
in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked, or otherwise secured to prevent
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sliding, falling or collapse." "Tiers" according to its ordinary dictionary meaning is "any
of a series of rows, layers, ranks, etc. arranged one above or behind another". (R. 228).
The US Army Corps of Engineers' safety rules referenced by the construction contract
similarly require that "Tools, materials and equipment subject to displacement or falling
be adequately secured." (R. 226) The incorporated contract "General Requirements"
required defendant to protect Ms. Day. These were specific duties undertaken by
defendant U-Systems for consideration.1
Defendant's construction manager acknowledged at trial that defendant's
employees should have observed the insulation problem and corrected it before Ms. Day
was called to the site to perform her inspection. (TR. 211) Had they done so, Ms. Day
would not have encountered the hazard.
In sum, it was plaintiffs contention at trial that the insulation had not been
correctly installed; that defendant or its employees should have identified and corrected
the situation prior to calling for the inspection; that the sheetrock as placed and leaned in
front of the insulation was a hazard; that it was foreseeable that Ms. Day in the
performance of her job duties would likely encounter the hazard in view of the improper
insulation installation and in doing so the sheetrock unless laid flat or secured could fall

!

The "General Requirements" are referred to in the record as an attachment to Plaintiffs
Response to Defendant U-Systems Trial Bench Memo on Duty (R. 296) but the attachment is not
found in the record, therefore plaintiff refers to the quoted language from the "General
Requirements" found. (R. 297) The transcripts of the motion hearings likewise refer on
numerous occasions to the "General Requirements" so appellant doesn't know why the actual
attachment is not included in record.
4

on her as it did causing her injuries.
In support of her theories of negligence and causation, plaintiff sought to introduce
as evidence at trial the contract between the federal government and defendant U-Systems
and its incorporated or referenced safety standards because it delineated specific safety
requirements on U-Systems, running to federal employees, and others on the job site
which U-Systems for consideration accepted (i.e. Federal OSHA standards, the US Army
Corps of Engineers safety requirements and the written responsibility contained in the
contracts "General Requirements" of site safety running specifically to government
employees who needed to on the site) and delineated specific safety codes to which
defendant U-Systems agreed to comply. Further, plaintiff sought to provide expert
testimony about what those safety standards meant in the construction trade and what acts
on the part of the contractor were necessary to comply with the Federal OSHA standards
and US Army Corps of Engineers' standards referenced by the contract to meet its duty of
care to plaintiff in this case regarding the safe storage of the sheetrock prior to its
installation.
In the latter regard, plaintiff employed Ken Todd who is a construction expert and
has wide experience in residential and commercial construction of the type being
performed at HAFB (R. 203-204) and understood the application and meaning of the
federal standards within the construction industry regarding safe storage of sheetrock. It
would have been his testimony that defendant U-Systems and its subcontractors were
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negligent in failing to lay the sheetrock flat so it would not present a fall hazard to Ms.
Day or alternatively in failing to secure the sheetrock to the wall, tying it off, so it could
not fall on her or anyone else who needed to be around it if they felt the need to stack it
vertically. (R. 198-202) (R. 191-192)
Defendant U-Systems filed motions in limine to exclude introduction of the
contract into evidence at trial arguing the contract did not provide evidence of a duty of
care owed by the defendant to Ms. Day and that Mr. Todd was not competent to testify as
an expert in Utah because his work experience had been in Nevada and California but not
Utah. Therefore, he had no knowledge about Utah OSHA standards. The court granted
both motions.
Thereafter, the case was tried to a jury which concluded "that defendant USystems was negligent but its negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff s injury."
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court erroneously excluded evidence from trial bearing directly on the
issue of proximate cause. Had that evidence been received by the jury, it would have had
a substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE FAILURE TO ADMIT INTO EVIDENCE AT
TRIAL RELEVANT INFORMATION BEARING ON
PROXIMATE CAUSATION HAS A SUBSTANTIAL
INFLUENCE ON TRIAL OUTCOME.
A jury may conclude that a defendant was negligent but its acts or omissions were
6

not a proximate cause of plaintiff s injury Holmstrom v. C.R. England. 8 P.3d 281 (Utah
App. 2000) however "the determination of proximate cause is not a pure fact question, it
is largely a conclusion available from the facts adduced" Milligan v. Capitol Furniture
Co.. 335 P.2d 619 (Utah 1959) (emphasis added) at trial. In other words "The plaintiff
must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is
more likely than not that the conduct of the defendant was a cause in fact of the result."
Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City. 919 P.2d 568 (Utah 1996) (emphasis
added) Consequently, the sum and character of the evidence adduced at trial is always
significant because the addition or omission of even a single admissible evidentiary fact,
document or opinion may well change entirely the deductions or inferences arising from
the facts concerning proximate causation.
Footnote 2 in Milligan v. Capitol Furniture Co.. recognized the precise point:
It is true that the question of proximate cause is ordinarily
one of fact for the jury. This is so because of different
conclusions generally arising on a conflict of the evidence, or
because of different deductions or inferences arising from
undisputed facts, in respect to the question of whether the injury
was the natural and probable consequence of the proved
negligence or wrongful act and ought to have been foreseen in
light of the attending circumstances..." (emphasis added)
Therefore, in a case where the jury has concluded the defendant's acts or
omissions were negligent as alleged the exclusion of any admissible evidence at trial
bearing on the defendant's duty is material regarding proximate causation and warrants a
new trial if improperly excluded by the trial court.
7

POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY
EXCLUDED THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT FROM
EVIDENCE AND IT WENT DIRECTLY TO THE ISSUE OF
PROXIMATE CAUSATION.
The contract between the federal government and U-Systems was a material piece
of evidence regarding proximate causation because it fleshed out aspects of defendant's
duty of care to plaintiff as an employee of the federal government whose job duties
required her to on and about the construction site. The Utah Supreme Court has
recognized that a party who breaches a duty of care toward another "may be found liable
to the other in tort, even where the relationship giving rise to such a duty originates in a
contract between the parties." DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983)
See also Alder v. Bayer AGFA Div. 61 P.3d 1068 (Utah 2002) and cases cited under Duty
of Care.
Here the defendant entered into a contract with the government which included
specific obligations toward government employees in addition to a common law duty of
care. The contract incorporated by reference and attachment Section 01000 which are
"General Requirements" for construction (R. 296) Paragraph 1.14 (R.222) states:
A.
The Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements
Manual, EM385-1-1, (see Contract Clauses Accident
Prevention) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(OSHA) Standards for Construction (Title 29, Code of Federal
Regulations Part 1926 and Part 1910 as revised from time to
time) and Air Force OSHA standards are all applicable to this
contract. In case of conflict the most stringent requirements of
the standards is applicable...
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Paragraph 1.16 Protection of Government Property and Personnel in subparagraph
B specified (R. 297):
The Contractor shall conduct his work so the government
property and personnel other personnel and work areas, shall be
protected at all times from inconvenience, damage of any nature,
or injury caused by this work until completion of the contract,
(emphasis added)
The contract referenced US Army Corps of Engineers Safety and Health
Requirements Manual, Section 11.1.04 specifically says (R. 224-225):
Tools, materials, and equipment subject to displacement and
falling shall be adequately secured, (emphasis added)
The contract also established a safety chain of command designating and placing
primary site safety responsibility on U-Systems. (R. 296-304)
The jury never received any of the above evidence because the contract and any
reference to the contract provisions or requirements or chain of responsibility was
excluded at trial. Here U-Systems undertook certain mandatory or affirmative safety
duties running to plaintiff as a federal government employee in addition to its common
law duty of care.
Instead, the Court instructed the jury (Instruction No. 26, R. 567) only on a
common law duty to exercise reasonable care. A mandatory or affirmative duty of care to
a particular class of people is of a different type and character of duty than a common law
duty of care when considering proximate causation. The jury found that plaintiff had
proved common law negligence against defendant U-Systems but failed to prove
9

proximate causation. Hearing and seeing that the defendant for consideration accepted
specific mandatory contractual obligations to protect plaintiff at all times from injury
rather than a general common law duty and that all items subject to falling "shall be"
secured under US Army Corps of Engineers guidelines sheds an entirely different light on
defendant's responsibilities. When "the excluded evidence would probably have had a
substantial influence in bringing about a different verdict" Gaw v. State Dept. of
Transportation, 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah App. 1990) then a new trial is warranted. In the
case at hand, the definition of "substantial" can be gleaned from the Court's discussion in
Holmstrom v. C.R. England Inc., 8 P.3d 281 (Utah 2000). Generally, the concept of
substantial in a proximate cause discussion means that "the actor's negligent conduct is
not a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another if the harm would have been
sustained even if the actor had not been negligent." Holmstrom v. C.R. England, citing
Restatement (Second) of Torts §431 cnt. a (1965).
Had the jury known that the defendant had undertaken an affirmative contractual
duty of care running directly to plaintiff, there is a high probability the outcome would
have been different on the question of proximate causation.
POINT III.
MR. TODD WAS A QUALIFIED
CONSTRUCTION EXPERT CAPABLE OF TESTIFYING
ABOUT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RELEVANT
SAFETY CODES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
REGARDING SAFE STORAGE OF SHEETROCK. THE
TRIAL COURT EXCLUDED THE TESTIMONY UPON THE
MISCONCEPTION HE NEEDED TO HAVE UTAH
CONSTRUCTION EXPERIENCE.
10

The trial court also erred in granting the defendant's motion in limine to exclude at
trial the testimony of plaintiff s expert Ken Todd. (R. 330) The argument made by the
defense was that Mr. Todd was not qualified to testify in Utah as to OSHA standards,
their application, meaning and methods of implementation in the construction trade
because he had not worked in Utah but instead had worked widely in Nevada and
California. (R. 645, p.2) (R. 646, p. 3-4)
The trial court ruled that Mr. Todd was a qualified construction expert. (R. 646,
p.22, lines 24 and 25) He was prevented from testifying because he hadn't worked in
Utah and the Court did not believe his testimony under Rule 702 would assist the jury in
understanding the application and implementation of Federal OSHA standard
1926.250(a)(1). (R. 646, p. 22-23)
Plaintiff must show the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the expert
testimony Ostler v. Albina Transfer Co., 781 P.2 445 (Utah App. 1989) and that the
excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in bringing about a
different verdict, Redevelopment Agency v. Tanner, 740 P.2d 1296, 1303-4 (Utah 1987).
However, the trial court does not properly exercise that discretion where its decision is
based upon a misconception of law. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah App.
1988)
In the case at hand, an understanding of Utah OSHA regulations and their
application was simply not relevant. As set out above, the contract between the federal
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government and U-Systems referenced Federal OSHA standards and US Army Corps of
Engineers standards which have national application (R. 645, p. 9-10) (R. 646, p. 4-6) and
a key issue at trial was what does Federal OSHA standard 1926.250(a)(1) mean in terms
of implementation regarding the safe storage of sheetrock at a construction site. (R. 646,
p. 8-10) The trial court instructed the jury (Instruction No. 44, R. 526) that "OSHA
Regulation 1926.250(a)(1) may be considered by you as evidence of the standard of care"
but the jury was completely deprived of what it means in terms of implementation within
the construction industry. Mr. Todd was prepared to testify that in this case it meant that
sheetrock is - either laid flat so it cannot fall or, if stacked or leaned vertically against a
wall must be tied off to prevent it from falling exactly the mechanism of injury which
occurred to plaintiff Yvonne Day. So, the jury was given the regulation without any
explanation of how it was to be applied and implemented by the construction trade in
order to be in compliance with 1926.250(a)(1). And, expert testimony that plaintiffs
injury would not have occurred had the sheetrock been laid Hat or tied off goes directly to
the heart of the issue of proximate cause in this case.
Instead, what the jury heard without rebuttal other than plaintiff herself, was that it
was a common practice in Utah to stack sheetrock vertically without tying it off. (R. 641,
p. 119) Therefore, inferentially, there was no violation of Federal OSHA standard
1926.250(a)(1).
Testimony that compliance with Federal OSHA standard 1926.250(a)(1) and the
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US Army Corps of Engineers safety standard necessitated that sheetrock be laid flat or
tied off directly rebuts the defense argument that U-Systems was neither negligent or a
proximate cause of plaintiff s injury and does not require construction experience in Utah,
rather it requires only a knowledge of the application and implementation of the Federal
OSHA standard. The federal standards are national in scope, it was a federal construction
project, the contract specifically referenced those standards and it was undisputed that Mr.
Todd possessed the requisite construction experience and expertise to testify concerning
these national safety codes with which he was undeniably familiar. (Mr. Todd was a
qualified construction expert - trial court. R. 646, p. 22, lines 24-25)
CONCLUSION
The trial court excluded from trial significant and substantial evidence bearing
directly on the issue of proximate causation. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to a new trial.
DATED this ,yj DWl

day of ^f>MJpJ»*/uf

£^f\£f
/

JAMES R. HASENYAGER
/'Attorney for Plaintiff/Appell
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Federal OSHA Standard 1926.250(a)(1)
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ADDENDUM A

KRSM 001513

Repair Warehouse Siding DRMO

Hill AFB, Utah

All utility outages; and traffic closures including streets, parking lots, and pedestnan closures shall be
scheduled during off duty hours and weekends unless otherwise approved by the Civil Engineenng
Project Manager. All outages and closures shall be scheduled as far in advance as possible with the
Civil Engineenng Project Manager and in no case less than 17 calendar days before the outage or closure. The Contractor shall obtain in wnting from the Civil Engineering Project Manager a statement
or schedule giving the permissible times for the outage or closure for particular installations and the
maximum time allowed for such outage or closure. The Contractor shall strictly observe such schedules and will be held responsible for any violations.
1.14

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS

A.

The Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements Manual, EM 385-1-1, (see Contract
Clauses ACCIDENT PREVENTION) and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA)
Standards for Construction (Title 29, Code of Federal Regulations Part 1926 and Part 1910 as
revised from time to time) and Air Force OSHA standards are all applicable to this contract. In
case of conflict the most stringent requirements of the standards is applicable. If recurring
violations and/or gross violation indicate that the safety performance is unsatisfactory,
corrective action shall be taken as directed by the Contracting Officer or the Civil Engineering
Project Manager.

B.

Any cutting, welding, brazing, or other hot work shall comply with AFI 32-200 l/OO-ALCHAFBS 1, Attachment 16. A USAF Weldmg, Cutting and Brazing permit, AF Form 592, is
required daily for all hot work.

C.

Contractor Confined Space Requirements:
The government's project manager will provide contractors with a copy of the confined space plan
for the confined space to be entered. A complete list of confined spaces is available from Ron
James, 777-1429, in the Base Safety Office. The owning organization of the confined space has
wntten a confined space plan for each confined space, which they own. This confined space plan
identifies the hazards and control of those hazards. The contractor shall obtain a copy of the confined space plan and obtain a confined space permit for the confined space they are to enter. Contractor is responsible for the requirements listed below:
1.
Understand the confined space plan. Ask owners of the confined space any questions
concerning the plan. Understand any lockout/tagout requirements of the confined space.
2.
Have their own confined space program for entry into the confined space.
3.
Ensure their personnel are confined space trained.
4.
Provide atmosphenc testing, entry equipment, and bamers.
5.
Provide own rescue plan.
6.
Inform Air Force facility supervisor when entry is to occur.
7.
Inform Air Force facility supervisor of any hazards introduced into their work area or
change of environment, which creates a hazard for Air Force personnel.
8.
Inform Air Force facility supervisor when entry is complete.
9.
Inform Air Force Facility supervisor of any new hazards or changes in environment.

1.15

COLD WEATHER PRECAUTIONS

ADDENDUM B

3.

Section 1.14 of the "General Requirements" specifically made

the Corps of Engineers Safety and Health Requirements Manual regarding accident
prevention and the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) applicable to this
contract. (Roy Reed deposition at Pages 35-36) (General Requirements, Section
1.14)
4.

Further, Section 1.16 Protection of Government Property and

Personnel in subparagraph B specified:
The Contractor shall conduct his work so the
government property and personnel, other
personnel, and work areas, shall be
protected at all times from inconvenience,
damage of any nature, or injury caused by
this work until completion of the contract.
5.

29 CFR Part 1910.5(a) which is specifically referenced in the

contract "General Requirements" (Section 01000) is the OSHA paragraph setting
forth the General Applicability of OSHA Standards. It says in relevant part:
Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this
Section, the standards contained in this part
shall apply with respect to employments
performed in a workplace in a State...
6.

29 CFR Part 1910.12(a) is the paragraph which applies

specifically to construction work. It says:
"Standards" The standards prescribed in
part 1926 of this Chapter are adapted as
occupational safety and health standards
under section 6 of this act and shall apply,
according to the provisions thereof, to every
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11.1.

HOUSEKEEPING

11.1.01.
All stairwaysr passageways, gangwayst
and acce&sways shall be kept free of materials r
supplies, and obstructions at all times,
11.1.02.
Loose or light material shall not be
stored or left on roofs or floors that are not
closed in, unless it is safely secured.
11.1.03.
Teolsr
materials, extension cords,
hoses, or debris shall not cause tripping or other
hazard.

shall

11.1.04. ' Toolsr materials, and equipment subject
to displacement or falling shall be adequately
secured.

otherwise
horsepower

11.1.05.
JSwpty bags having contained
lime,
cement, and other dust-producing material shall be
removed
periodically
as
specified
by the

fianrrf!La0d.rotary 3 e t P i e c i n g
«ccocdaace with 25.G.

°^rator is

jo ^ovejtr under, or
* is stopped and the
sd and the^soptice

61

ADDENDUM D

General requirements for stoi

-1926.250

Regulations (Standards - 29 CFR)
General requirements for storage. - 1926.250
4| OSHA Regulations (Standards - 29 CFR) - Table of Contents

• Standard Number: 1926.250
• Standard Title: General requirements for storage.

• Subpart Number: H
• SubPart Title: Materials Handling, Storage, Use, and Disposal

(a)(1)
All materials stored in tiers shall be stacked, racked, blocked, interlocked, or
otherwise secured to prevent sliding, falling or collapse.
(a)(2)
Maximum safe load limits of floors within buildings and structures, in pounds per
square foot, shall be conspicuously posted in all storage areas, except for floor or
slab on grade. Maximum safe loads shall not be exceeded,
(a)(3)
Aisles and passageways shall be kept clear to provide for the free and safe
movement of material handling equipment or employees. Such areas shall be
kept in good repair.
(a)(4)
When a difference in road or working levels exist, means such as ramps,
blocking, or grading shall be used to ensure the safe movement of vehicles
between the two levels.

..1926.250(b)
(b)
Material storage.
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